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Preference variables are included in the inverse Rotterdam model based on the Tintner-
Ichimura-Basmann relationship linking preference effects on quantities demanded to 
price effects and preference effects on marginal utilities.  Restrictions are made on the 
effects of the preference variables on the marginal utilities, resulting in reductions in the 
parameter space for the preference variables in both direct and inverse demand systems.  
The model is used to analyze impacts of product quality on fresh citrus demand.   
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Non-price, non-income variables such as advertising and quality measures are sometimes 
added to the consumer utility function and associated direct demand system to measure 
preference shifts (e.g., Basmann; Phlips; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b).  In general, the 
only restrictions on the demand impacts of preference-variables are for adding up.  
Demand increases for some goods due to a preference variable change must be offset by 
demand decreases for other goods to satisfy the budget constraint.  This implies that for n 
goods and n product-specific advertising variables, there are n x n-1 advertising impacts 
in the demand system to estimate.  Since the number of such impacts can be quite large 
and difficult to estimate, additional restrictions on the impacts are sometimes considered. 
 One source of restrictions has been the Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship which 
shows how impacts of preference variables on utility carry over to the direct demand 
system.  Various restrictions based on this relationship have been explored in order to 
reduce the preference-variable parameter space to a tractable level in direct demand 
systems (e.g., Theil, 1980b; Duffy; Brown and Lee, 1997, 2002).  What has not been 
explored, and the subject of this paper, is the use of the Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann 
relationship as a source of restrictions for the corresponding inverse demand parameter 
space.  
The Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship links preference (variable) effects on 
quantities demanded to price effects and preference effects on marginal utilities.  2 
 
Restrictions have been made on the preference effects on marginal utilities, resulting in 
reductions in the preference-variable parameter space in direct demand systems (e.g., 
Theil, 1980b; Duffy).  The present paper shows the associated implications for the 
inverse demand parameters.  Preference effects in the direct demand system are translated 
into corresponding effects in the inverse demand system, and an inverse-demand system 
with a preference-variable parameterization, that can be straightforwardly used to explore 
preference restrictions as in the direct demand system, is developed.  
The results of this paper show that given the direct demand elasticities with 
respect to n product-specific preference variables can be written as –ε
*γ where ε
* is a 
matrix of compensated price elasticities and γ is a matrix of marginal utility elasticities 
with respect to the preference variables, the inverse demand elasticities are (I - ι w’)γ, 
where I is the identity matrix, ι is a unit vector and w is a vector of budget shares. 
An empirical analysis of quality impacts in an inverse demand system for U.S. 
fresh citrus is also discussed.  The focus is on how prices for different varieties of citrus 
are impacted by variety specific quality variables.  
The paper consists of a review of direct and inverse demand systems, 
development of the relationships between preference effects in the two alternative 
demand systems, discussion of the empirical study and conclusions. 
 
Review of Direct and Inverse Demand Systems in Context of the Rotterdam Model 
Consider the utility maximization problem confronting consumers---how to allocate 
income over available goods.  Formally, the  problem can be written as maximization of 3 
 
u = u(q’, z’) subject to p=q = x, where u is utility; p= = (p1 , . . . , pn) and q= = (q1 , . . . , q n) 
are price and quantity vectors with pi  and qi being the price and quantity of good i, 
respectively; x is total expenditures or income; and z’ = (z1 , . . . , zn)  is a vector of 
product-specific preferences variables such as advertising.  The first-order conditions for 
this problem are Mu/Mq = λp and p=q = x, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier which is 
equal to Mu/Mx.  For direct demand, the solution of the first-order conditions yields q = 
q(p, x, z), and the Lagrange multiplier equation λ = λ(p, x, z).  Alternatively, for indirect 
or inverse demand, the solution is v = v(q, z), where v’ = (p1/x, …, pn/x) or income- 
normalized prices.  The quantities and prices for these two solutions are of course exactly 
the same.   Below, the relationships between the two demand systems are reviewed with a 
focus on the effects of the preference variables.  The Rotterdam demand model
1 is used 
for this purpose as the relationship between direct and inverse demand with respect to 
preference variable impacts can be straightforwardly shown for this demand 
specification.  The Rotterdam model is based on the total differential of the first-order 
conditions, Mu/Mq = λp and p=q = x, making it convenient to examine preference variable 
impacts through the Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship which is based on an 
extension of this total differential.
2 
Following Theil (1975, 1976, 1980a,b), the direct Rotterdam model can be written 
as 
(1) wi d(log qi) = θi d(log Q) + 3j πij d(log pj) + 3jβij d(log zj)  i=1 , . . , n,   4 
 
where wi = piqi /x is the budget share for good i; θi = pi (Mqi/Mx) is the marginal propensity 
to consume (MPC) for good i; d(log Q) = 3wi d(log qi) is the Divisia volume index, a 
measure of the change in real income or utility (d(log Q) ≈ d(log x)- 3wi d(log pi)) 
(Theil, 1971);
 πij = (pi pj /x) sij is the Slutsky coefficient, with sij = (Mqi/Mpj + qj Mqi/Mx ) 
being the i,j
th.element of the substitution matrix S; and βij  = wi (Mlog qi/Mlog zj).  The 
elasticity of the demand with respect to the j
th preference variable is (Mlog qi/Mlog zj), and, 
thus, the preference variable coefficient βij is the budget share times this elasticity.  The 
MPC also equals the budget share times the income elasticity ηi = (Mlog qi/Mlog x), i.e., θi 
= wi ηi; and the Slutsky coefficient equals the budget share times the compensated price 
elasticity ε
*
ij = (Mlog qi/Mlog pj)|u contant, i.e., πij = wi ε
*
ij.  The uncompensated price 
elasticity is εij = ε
*
ij - ηiwj.  Overall, the Rotterdam model is thus a Hicksian or 
compensated demand system with the Divisia volume index indicating changes in real 
income and the Slutsky coefficients indicating compensated effects. 
  Based on the Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship, the preference-variable 
coefficients in equation (1) can be written as 
(2)  βik = -3j πijγjk, 
where γjk = Mlog(Mu/Mqj)/Mlog(zk), i.e., γjk is the elasticity of the marginal utility of good j 
with respect to the preference variable zk.  Equation (2) is the source of preference-
variable parameter restrictions in this paper.  
  Substituting equation (2) into model (1) results in 
(3) wi d(log qi) = θi d(log Q) + 3j πij (d(log pj) - 3kγjk d(log zk))     i=1 , . . , n, 5 
 
where the term d(log pj) - 3kγjk d(log zk) can be viewed as a preference, adjusted price. 
  The corresponding inverse Rotterdam model can be written as (e.g., Barten and 
Bettendorf; Brown, Lee and Seale) 
(4) wi d(log vi) = gi d(log Q) + 3j hij d(log qj) + 3j αij d(log zj)  i=1 , . . , n, 
where again vi = pi/xi; gi is the scale coefficient defined as gi = wi(Mlog vi/Mlog k), with k 
being a scalar that can proportionally change some reference bundle (q=kq* with q* 
being the reference bundle)---similar as in the direct Rotterdam parameterization, the 
scale coefficient is the budget share times the scale elasticity; hij = wi(Mlog vi/Mlog qj)|u 
constant or the budget share times the compensated quantity elasticity or flexibility (the hij’s 
are referred to as Antonelli coefficients and are the counterpart of the Slutsky 
coefficients); and αij = wi (Mlog vi/Mlog zj) or the budget share times the inverse-demand, 
preference variable elasticity.  The scale elasticity, compensated flexibility and inverse 
preference variable elasticity are denoted as μ i = (Mlog vi/Mlog k); δ
*
ij = (Mlog vi/Mlog qj) |u 
constant;  ρij = (Mlog vi/Mlog zj), respectively.  The uncompensated flexibility is δij = δ
*
ij + μ i 
wj. 
  To show the relationship between the direct and inverse demand systems, the 
models are formulated below in term of matrices and elasticities, i.e. 
(5a)  ŵDq = θDQ + π(Dp - γDz)    (direct demand coefficients), 
or, 
(5b)  ŵDq = ŵηDQ + ŵε
*(Dp - γDz)  (direct demand elastictities), 
and 6 
 
(6a)  ŵDv = gDQ + hDq + αDz    (inverse demand coefficients), 
or 
(6b)  ŵDv = ŵμDQ + ŵδ
*Dq + ŵρDz  (inverse demand elastictities), 
where ŵ is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements being the budget shares; Dq = [d 
log qi], Dp = [d log pi], Dz = [d log zi], and Dv = [d log vi] are all n x 1 vectors; DQ = d 
log Q = w’Dq ≈ Dx – w’Dp, where Dx= dlog x and w’ is a 1 x  n vector of budget shares 
(Theil, 1971); θ =[θi] is an n x 1 vector of MPCs;  π = [πij] is an n x n matrix of Slutsky 
coefficients; γ =[ γij] is an n x n matrix of elasticities of marginal utilities with respect to 
the preference variables; η = [ηi] is an n x 1 vector of income elasticities; ε
*= [ε
*
ij] is an n 
x n matrix of compensated price elasticities; g is an n x 1 vector of scale coefficients; h is 
an n x n matrix of quantity or Antonelli coefficients; α is an n x n matrix of preference 
coefficients; μ is an n x 1 matrix of scale elasticities; δ
*  is an n x n matrix of compensated 
quantity elasticities; and ρ is an n x n matrix of advertising elasticities. 
The general restrictions on the direct Rotterdam model are (e.g., Theil 1975, 
1976, 1980a,b) 
(7a) adding  up:    ι’θ = 1   ι’π = 0  
(7b) homogeneity:    πι = 0   
(7c) symmetry:    π = π’, 
where ι’ is an n x 1 vector of ones.  Note that restriction (7a) requires that the preference 
effects also obey adding up, i.e., given the advertising coefficient matrix β equals -πγ, ι’β 
= - ι’πγ = 0, since ι’π = 0.  Restrictions (7a) through (7c) are for the usual Rotterdam 
parameterization (5a).  The corresponding restrictions on the elasticities in specification 7 
 
(5b) are a)  w’η  = 1 (Engle aggregation) and w’ε
* =  0 or w’(ε + η w’)  =  w’ε + w’= 0 
(Cournot aggregation), b) ε




*’ŵ  (symmetry).     
The general restrictions on the inverse Rotterdam model are (e.g., Barten and 
Bettendorf; Brown, Lee and Seale) 
(8a) adding  up:    ι’g = -1    ι’h = 0   ι’α = 0, 
(8b) homogeneity:    hι = 0   
(8c)  symmetry:    h = h’. 
The corresponding restrictions on the elasticities in specification (6b) are a)  w’μ  = -1  
and w’δ
* =  0 or w’(δ - μw’)  =  w’δ + w’= 0, b) δ




*’ŵ.     
 
Relationship Between Preference Effects in the Direct and Inverse Demand Systems 
Anderson has shown the relationship between the direct and inverse demand systems 
with respect to price, quantity, income and scale effects.  Below, these relationships are 
extended to the preference variable effects.  The objective is to transform the direct 
Rotterdam model to the inverse Rotterdam model to reveal the structure of the inverse 
demand preference-variable coefficients.  The first step is to pre-multiply equation (5b) 
by ŵ
-1 to find 
(9) Dq  =  ηDQ + ε
*(Dp - γDz). 
 If  ε
* were nonsingular, we could simply multiply both sides of equation (9) by the 
inverse of ε
* and rearrange, but this is not the case given (7b).  The problem is that price 8 
 
effects of equation (9) are compensated.  An inversion, however, can be made by 
transforming the compensated elasticities of equation (9) to uncompensated ones.  To 
accomplish this, replace DQ in equation (9) by its equivalent Dx – w’Dp, and rearrange 
the result, i.e., 
(10a) Dq  =  η(Dx - w’DP) + ε
*(Dp - γDz), 
or 
(10b) Dq  =  ηDx + (ε
* - η w’)Dp - ε
*γDz, 
or 
(10c) Dq  =  ηDx + εDp - ε
*γDz, 
where again ε = ε
* - η w’, the uncompensated price elasticities.  The homogeneity 
condition requires ει = -η since ει = ε
*ι - η w’ι or ει = -η, given ε
*ι = ŵπ ι = 0, by 
restriction (7b).   The corresponding inverse relationship is δι = μ since δι = δ
* ι + μ w’ ι 
= μ, given restrictions (8b).  
Based on the inverse function theorem, the uncompensated elasticity matrix ε will 
be nonsingular, in general, so that multiplying equation (10c) through by its inverse ε
-1, 
denoted by δ,
 and rearranging yields 
 (11a)  Dp = δDq - δηDx + δε
*γD z ,       
or, further rearranging and simplifying, 
 (11b)  Dv = μ DQ + δ
*Dq + (I - ι w’)γDz, 
where again Dv= Dp – ιDx, δ
* = δ - μw’, DQ = w’Dq,  and I is the n x n identity matrix.  
In equation (11a), the term –δη  equals the  n x 1 vector of unit elements, since δε = I, and 
thus δε ι =  ι or –δη = ι  given ε ι = -η; this relationship follows from the homogeneity 9 
 
condition noted after equation (7), which for convenience is repeated in the present 
context as δ(ε
* - η w’)ι = Iι = ι, or δε
*ι - δη w’ι = ι or -δη= ι, since ε
*ι = 0 based on 
condition (7b) and w’ι =1.  The term δε
* in equation (11a) equals I - ι w’, since δ(ε
* - η 
w’) = I, and thus  δε
* = I + δη w’, and given the previous result that -δη= ι, we have δε
* = 
I - ι w’.  (Similarly, εδι = εμ = ι and εδ
* = I - ιw’. Thus, εδ
* = δε
*.) 
  Finally, multiplying (11b) through by ŵ yields  
 (12)  ŵDv =  ŵμ DQ + ŵδ
*Dq + (ŵ - w w’)γDz, 
which is the same as equation (6a) or (6b) except for the specification of the coefficients 
on the preference variables (Dz).  In equations (6a) and (6b), these coefficients are α = 
ŵρ while in equation (12) they are (ŵ - w w’)γ. Thus, we conclude 
(13)  α = ŵρ = (ŵ - w w’)γ. 
Preference variable coefficient specification (13) can also be obtained using the 
Hotelling-Wold identity which states 
(14) vi = Mu/Mqi / 3k qk Mu/Mqk. 
Taking the log of equation (14) results in  
(15) log  vi = log(Mu/Mqi) - log(3k qk Mu/Mqk), 
and differentiating this equation with respect to log zj yields 
(16)  Mlog vi / Mlog zj = M log(Mu/Mqi)/ Mlog zj 
 – (1/(3k qk Mu/Mqk)) (3k qkM(Mu/Mqk)/Mlog zj + 3k (Mu/Mqk) Mqk/Mlog zj). 10 
 
Based on a) the first order condition Mu/Mqj = λpj, b) 3jqjMu/Mqj= λ3j pjqj = λx and 
c) given qk are fixed so that Mqk/Mlog z = 0, the last term on the right-hand side of 
equation (16) can be written as  
– (1/(3k qk Mu/Mqk)) (3k qk(λpk/Mu/Mqk) M(Mu/Mqk)/Mlog zj) 
 or 
– (λ/(3k qk Mu/Mqk)) (3k pkqk Mlog(Mu/Mqk)/Mlog zj) 
or 
– 3k wk Mlog(Mu/Mqk)/Mlog zj. 
Hence, equation (16) can be written as 
(17a)  Mlog vi / Mlog zj = M log(Mu/Mqi)/Mlog(zj) – 3k wk Mlog(Mu/Mqk)/Mlog zj, 
or, multiplying through by wi, 
(17b) wi Mlog vi / Mlog zj = wi γij – wi 3k wk γkj, 
where γij =M log(Mu/Mqi)/ Mlog(zj).  Equation (17b) is the non-matrix version of equation 
(13).    
  In the above direct and inverse demand systems (5a) and (12), the matrix γ is 
potentially a source of restrictions on the preference variable impacts; that is, restrictions 
on the preference variable impacts can be made through restrictions on the effects of the 
preference variables on marginal utilities.  For example, in the direct demand system, 
Theil (1980b), assumed γ was a scalar times the Identity matrix, while, Duffy assumed it 
was a diagonal matrix (â). The Theil (1980b) and Duffy specifications are based on the 
assumption that the preference variable for good i only effects the marginal utility of that 11 
 
good.  For a group of uniform substitutes, Brown and Lee (2002) showed that the same 
result can be obtained based on the weaker assumption that γ = â + ιb’ where b’= (b1, b2, 
…, bn) with bi being a scalar; this specification allows the preference variable for good i 
to effect the marginal utility of other goods, uniformly across the goods in the group.  In 
the direct and inverse models, (5a) and (12), the preference variable effects are -πγ and 
(ŵ - w w’)γ, respectively, which for the above structure for γ become -π(â + ιb’) = -πâ 
and (ŵ - w w’) (â + ιb’) = (ŵ - w w’) â  with the terms related to b’ disappearing given -
πι = 0 based on restriction (7b) and (ŵ - w w’) ι= 0.  Although assuming b is zero yields 
the same result, such an assumption may not realistic for a group of closely related goods 
such as uniform substitutes.  Thus, we see that the Duffy assumption can be extended to 
cases where preference variables have uniform effects across the marginal utilities of the 
goods in the group. 
In estimating the inverse model, there is, however, an endogeneity problem with 
the budget shares embedded in the term (ŵ - w w’)γ.  This problem might be handled by 
using mean budget shares in this term, instrumental variables, or perhaps lagged budget 
shares, as suggested to deal with a similar endogeneity problem in the Almost Ideal 
Demand System involving budget shares embedded in the Stone price index (Eales and 
Unnevehr).
3    
 
Application 
Impacts of fresh citrus quality on prices were examined using U.S. retail data on fresh 
citrus sales (Freshlook Marketing Group).  Retail prices, quantities and the percentage of 12 
 
volume sales that are random weight were examined for three varieties of citrus: 
grapefruit, oranges and tangerines.  Fresh citrus is generally sold in two forms:  1) 
individual pieces, referred to as random-weight (RW) fruit, and 2) bags/cases, referred to 
as fixed-weight (FW) fruit.   The two types of citrus are usually displayed side by side in 
produce sections in retail stores but priced differently.  The quality of RW and FW fruit 
may differ with respect to size, variety and external look.  The RW percentage is treated 
as a measure of quality but may also reflect merchandising and packaging tactics.  A 
summary of the data are provided in Table 1. The data are weekly from week ending 
1/8/2006 through 2/15/2009.   
Fresh citrus are seasonal with their availability changing substantially over the 
course of a year (volumes are greatest during late fall, winter and early spring).  When 
volumes are high, prices tend to be low and vice versa.  Given this situation, a 
conditional demand version of inverse Rotterdam model (4), with the preference-variable 
coefficients specified as on the right hand side of equation (13), was used to estimate how 
fresh citrus prices are impacted by scale (overall availability of oranges, grapefruit and 
tangerines), relative product quantities (Antonelli substitution), and quality/packaging as 
measured by the RW percentages.  Following the preceding section, it is assumed that the 
quality variable for a variety of citrus (i) has a specific impact (ai) on the marginal utility 
of that variety of citrus and a uniform substitute or generic impact (bi) on the marginal 
utilities of all varieties (including the variety in question).  In this case, â is a diagonal 
matrix with the diagonal elements being (a1, a2, a3) for the three citrus varieties studied, b
’ 
= (b1, b2, b3), and the matrix indicating the impacts of quality on the marginal utilities in 13 
 
equation (13) is γ = â + ιb’.  The term (ŵ - w w’) γDz in the model then becomes (ŵ - w 
w’) â Dz, since (ŵ - w w’) ιb’ = 0.  Thus, the impact of preference variable j in the 
equation for good i can be written as (wi ∆ij - wiwj) aj Dzj, where again ∆ij is the 
Kronecker delta.  In estimating this term lagged budget shares were used to avoid the 
endogeneity problem mentioned earlier.  
Homogeneity and symmetry, conditions (8b) and (8c), were imposed as part of 
the maintained hypothesis in estimating the model.  The adding-up condition (8a) holds 
as the data add up by construction.  The infinitely small changes in the logarithms of 
prices and quantities in the differential model were measured by discrete differences 
(Theil 1975, 1976).  The quality variables, which are percentages of volumes that are 
RW, were not transformed to log values, and the levels of these variables were similarly 
differenced.  To account for seasonality in demand, the variables were 52
nd differenced 
(for the 52 weeks in a year)-- d(log pit) = log pit -log pit-52, d(log qit) = log qit -log qit-52 and 
dzkt = zkt -zkt-52 (Duffy, Brown and Lee 1997).  Average budget share values underlying 
the differencing were used in constructing the model variables---wi,t was replaced by (wi,t 
 + wi,t-52 )/2. 
The demand specifications studied are conditional on expenditure or income 
allocated to the three citrus varieties.  Income allocated to the citrus group is measured by 
the conditional Divisia volume index for this group which was treated as independent of 
the error term added to each fresh citrus inverse demand equation for estimation, based 
on the theory of rational random behavior (Theil 1980a; Brown, Behr and Lee).
4  As the 
data add up by construction---the sum of  the  left-hand-side variables in the inverse 14 
 
Rotterdam model equal the negative of the conditional Divisia volume index--the error 
covariance matrix was singular and an arbitrary equation was excluded (the model 
estimates are invariant to the equation deleted as shown by Barten, 1969).  The 
parameters of the excluded equation can be obtained from the adding-up conditions or by 
re-estimating the model omitting a different equation. The equation error terms were 
assumed to be contemporaneously correlated and the full information maximum 
likelihood procedure (TSP) was used to estimate the system of equations.  
In estimating the (conditional) inverse Rotterdam model for fresh citrus, first-
order autocorrelation was found to exist, which required estimating an additional 
parameter ρ (Berndt and Savin).  Model estimates are shown in Table 2 (equations (4) 
with α specified in equation (13)).    To measure the fit of the system of equations, a 
system R
2, based on the Wald test and dependent on the equation omitted in estimating 
the model, was calculated (McElroy, Bewley).  The system R
2 ranged from .87 to .99 
depending on the equation deleted.  Although not appropriate for measuring goodness of 
fit for a system of equations, single equation R
2 values for grapefruit, orange, and 
tangerine prices were .86, .99 and .69, respectively.  
All coefficient estimates, except that for the tangerine quantity effect on the 
grapefruit price, are significantly different from zero to the extent their values are twice 
or greater than their estimated standard errors.  The scale coefficients are all negative, 
indicating that as the overall volume of citrus in the market increases, prices for these 
varieties decline.  All own-quantity or Antonelli coefficients are negative, consistent with 
the law of demand.  The cross-quantity coefficients were positive indicating (net) 15 
 
complementary relationships between these varieties at the compensated demand level, 
except the insignificant tangerine quantity effect on the grapefruit price indicating a 
neutral relationship; at the uncompensated level, all cross effects were negative, 
indicating (gross) substitution, as noted below. The net complementary relationship 
suggests that some households may be purchasing combinations of these citrus varieties.  
 All coefficients on the quality measures were positive, suggesting the quality of random 
weight fruit is higher than that for fixed weight fruit.  The RW coefficients may also be 
reflecting a preference for less restricted packaging or the impact of other in-store 
differences in merchandising of RW and FW fruit.  
The uncompensated elasticities (flexibilities) for the inverse citrus demand system 
are provided in Table 3.  The scale elasticities for grapefruit, oranges and tangerines are   
-.93, -.99 and -1.06, respectively, indicating the if all three quantities increased 
proportionately, say by 10% , the price of tangerines would decrease the greatest 
by10.6%, while the price of grapefruit would decrease the least by  9.3%.   The own-
quantity elasticities for grapefruit, oranges and tangerines are -.38, -.73, and -.39, 
respectively, indicating the price of oranges is more sensitive to own-quantity than the 
other two varieties.  The cross-quantity elasticities are all negative, reflecting substitution 
at the uncompensated level.  
The quality estimates indicate that if the RW shares of tangerines, grapefruit  and 
oranges are increased say by 10 percentage points, their prices would increase by 7.6%, 
2.7% and .8%, respectively, excluding cross effects.  The cross-RW estimates indicate 
negative impacts on competing varietal prices, and if, for example, the RW share of 16 
 
tangerines is increased by 10 percentage points, the prices of grapefruit and oranges 
would each decrease by about 2.1%.  To the extent the fruit in each varietal category is 
ranked by quality and the highest quality fruit is sold as RW, the results suggest that the 
retail price and hence revenue might be enhanced by some additional sorting of FW fruit 
by quality and selling more as RW.  Other factors, however, may offset such possible 
benefits.  For example, RW fruit may be subject to a higher spoilage rate as a result of 
consumer handling of the fruit, and the bags and other containers in which FW fruit is 
sold may hide external fruit blemishes to some degree, although internal quality of the 
fruit may be relatively good.  
In the empirical application here, the uniform substitute restrictions or essentially 
equivalent restrictions suggested by Duffy reduce the preference-variable parameter 
space by a factor of n-1 where again n is the number of goods.  Three RW coefficients 
were estimated for the six RW impacts in the model--three RW variables per equation 
times two equations with the impacts for the third equation determined from the adding-
up condition.  More generally, for system of n equations, n coefficients would need to be 
estimated for n x n-1 preference effects.  Thus, to the extent the uniform substitute or 
Duffy assumptions are acceptable, the reduction in the parameter space could be quite 
large. 
The results of this study may also be of interest for demand analyses where it is 
useful to have corresponding estimates of direct and inverse demand elasticities or 
impacts with respect to some preference variables.  Based on equation (11b), the inverse 
demand elasticities with respect to the preference variables are (I - ι w’)γ, while based on 17 
 
equation (10b), the direct demand elasticities with respect to the preference variables are 
-ε
*γ.  It was also found that δε
* = I - ι w’ where δ is the matrix of uncompensated quantity 
elasticities for the inverse demand equations.  Thus, multiplying -δ
-1, which equals –ε or 
the negative of the uncompensated price elasticities for the direct demand equations, 
times the inverse preference variable elasticities (I - ι w’)γ yields the direct demand, 
preference variable elasticities -ε
*γ.  In the present analysis, the direct demand, own-RW 
impacts (∂(log qi)/∂zi) at mean budget shares are 1.01 (.27) for grapefruit, .31 (.08) for 
oranges and 3.91 (.76),  with the corresponding inverse demand, own-RW impacts (∂(log 
pi)/∂zi) from Table 3 in parentheses.  The relatively large direct demand impact for 
tangerines is a result of a relatively high (direct demand) own-price elasticity, 
corresponding to the relatively low (inverse demand) own-quantity elasticity, and a 
relatively high impact (γ) of the RW variable on the marginal utility for tangerines. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper extends the Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship to specifying preference 
variable shifts in inverse demand systems.  The Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship 
indicates how effects of preference variables on quantities demanded are related to price 
effects and effects of the preference variables on the marginal utilities.  This relationship 
has been a source of restrictions on preference coefficients in direct demand systems.  
The extension here is based on the relationship between the direct and indirect demand 
systems and the corresponding preference variable impacts in each system.  In both 
systems, a change in a preference variable has the same basic impacts on the marginal 18 
 
utilities, but in the direct demand system, the impacts on the marginal utilities results in 
demand impacts through the price effects, while in the inverse demand system the 
marginal utility impacts result in impacts on prices through the budget shares.   
  The addition of a set of preference variables like product specific advertising 
levels results in a relatively large increase in the parameter space of direct and inverse 
demand systems, which may make estimation of the preference variable impacts difficult. 
 For such demand models, theoretically based restrictions on the preference variable 
impacts may be of interest.  This paper shows that restrictions on the impacts of 
preference variables on marginal utilities offer an approach to estimating the effects of 
preference variables in not only direct demand systems but also inverse demand systems. 
 An empirical study of the demand for fresh citrus illustrates the modeling approach.  
Varietal specific, quality variables are assumed to impact prices through the marginal 
utilities similarly as has been suggested for direct demand systems. The preference 
variable specifications of this study may not only be of interest for estimation but may 
also be useful for converting direct demand system impacts to inverse demand system 





Anderson, R.W.  1980.  ASome Theory of Inverse Demand for Applied Demand 
Analysis.@  European Economic Review 14:281-90. 
Barnett, W.A.  1984.  AOn the Flexibility of the Rotterdam Model: A First Empirical 
Look.@  European Economic Review 24:285-89. 
Barten, A.P.  1969.  AMaximum Likelihood Estimation of a Complete System of Demand 
Equations.@  European Economic Review 1:7-73. 
Barten, A.P.  1993.  AConsumer Allocation Models: Choice of Functional Form.@  
Empirical Economics 18:129-58. 
Barten, A.P., and L.J. Bettendorf.  1989.  APrice Formation of Fish: An Application of an 
Inverse Demand System.@  European Economic Review 33:1509-25. 
Basmann, R.L.  1956.  AA Theory of Demand with Preference Variables.@  Econometrica 
24:47-58. 
Berndt, E.R., and N.E. Savin.  1975.  AEstimation and Hypothesis Testing in Singular 
Equation Systems With Autoregressive Disturbances.@  Econometrica 43:937-56. 
Bewley, R.  1986.  Allocation Models: Specification, Estimation and Applications.  
Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company. 
 Brown, M., R. Behr, and J. Lee.  1994.  AConditional Demand and Endogeneity: A Case 
Study of Demand for Juice Products.@  Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics 19:129-40. 20 
 
Brown, M., and J. Lee.  1997.  AIncorporating Generic and Brand Advertising Effects in 
the Rotterdam Demand System.@  International Journal of Advertising 16:211-20. 
Brown, M., and J. Lee.  2002.  ARestrictions on the Effects of Preference Variables in the 
Rotterdam Model.@  Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 34:17-26. 
Brown, M., J. Lee, and J. Seale, Jr.  1995.  AA Family of Inverse Demand Systems and 
Choice of Functional Form.@  Empirical Economics 20:519-30. 
Byron, R.P.  1984.  AOn the Flexibility of the Rotterdam Model.@  European Economic 
Review 24:273-83. 
Deaton, A.S., and J. Muellbauer.  1980a.  AAn Almost Ideal Demand System.@  American 
Economic Review 70:312-26. 
Deaton, A.S., and J. Muellbauer.  1980b.  Economics and Consumer Behavior.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Duffy, M.H.  1987.  AAdvertising and the Inter-Product Distribution of Demand.@  
European Economic Review 31:1051-70. 
Eales, J., and L. Unnevehr.  1988.  ADemand for Beef and Chicken products: Separability 
and Structural Change.@  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 70(3):521-
32. 
Freshlook Marketing Group: http://www.freshlookmarketing.com/index.htm 
Ichimura, S.  1950-51.  AA Critical Note on the Definition of Related Goods.@  Review of 
Economic Studies 18:179-83. 
McElroy, M.B.  1977.  “Goodness-of-Fit for Seemingly Unrelated Regressions.”  
  Journal of Econometrics 6:381-87. 21 
 
Mountain, D.C. 1988.  “The Rotterdam Model: An Approximation in Variable Space.” 
Econometrica 56:477-84. 
Phlips, L. 1974.   Applied Consumer Demand Analysis.  Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Company. 
Piggott, N.E.  2003.  “The Nested PIGLOG Model: An Application to U.S. Food 
Demand.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85(1):1-15. 
Theil, H.  1971.  Principles of Econometrics.  New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Theil, H.  1975.  Theory and Measurement of Consumer Demand, Vol. I.  Amsterdam: 
North-Holland Publishing Company. 
Theil, H.  1976.  Theory and Measurement of Consumer Demand, Vol. II.  Amsterdam: 
North-Holland Publishing Co. 
Theil, H.  1980a.  The System-Wide Approach to Microeconomics.  Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Theil, H.  1980b.  System-Wide Explorations in International Economics, Input-Output 
Analysis, and Marketing Research.  Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. 
Tintner, G.  1952.  AComplementarity and Shifts in Demand@ Metroeconomica 4:1-4. 22 
 
 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics: Weekly U.S. Retail Orange Grapefruit and Tangerine 
Sales, Week Ending 1/8/2006 through 2/15/2009. 
 Variable  Variety   Unit  Mean  Std Dev
Volume Grapefruit  mil.  lbs  4.242  2.146
Oranges mil.  lbs  16.797  8.057
Tangerines mil.  lbs  6.032  6.337
Price Grapefruit  $/lb  1.006  0.146
Oranges $/lb  1.134  0.254
Tangerines $/lb  1.405  0.229
Expenditure mil.  $  28.689  11.786
Budget Share  Grapefruit  %  14.4%  2.7%
Oranges %  63.7%  12.5%
Tangerines %  21.9%  13.8%
RW Share
a Grapefruit  % 59.6%  5.1%
Oranges %  60.0%  8.9%
   Tangerines  %  15.6%  12.0%




Table 2.  Inverse Rotterdam Model Estimates, Equations 4 and 13.  
 
Equation  Explanatory Var.  Coeff. Est.  Std Error  T-Statistic  P-Value 
 
Grapefruit P.  Scale (g1) -0.1360  0.0085  -16.0066  [.000] 
Grapefruit Q. (h11) -0.0352  0.0045  -7.7330  [.000] 
Orange Q. (h12)
a 0.0327  0.0042  7.7916  [.000] 
Tangerine Q. (h13)
b 0.0024  0.0019  1.2779  [.201] 
   Gft. RW % (a1)
c,d 0.3200  0.1069  2.9945  [.003] 
 
Orange P.  Scale (g2) -0.6300  0.0227  -27.7246  [.000] 
Orange Q. (h22) -0.0641  0.0070  -9.1997  [.000] 
Tangerine Q. (h23)
b 0.0314  0.0063  4.9517  [.000] 
   Oran. RW % (a2)
c,d 0.2219  0.0918  2.4165  [.016] 
 
Tangerine P.  Scale (g3) -0.2340  0.0233  -10.0211  [.000] 
Tangerine Q. (h33) -0.0338  0.0069  -4.9231  [.000] 
   Tan. RW % (a3)
c,d 0.9746  0.3676  2.6515  [.008] 
 
Autocorrelation Coeff. (ρ) 0.9008  0.0297  30.3505  [.000] 
 
a Parameter h12 shared by equation (2) by symmetry. 
b Parameters h13 and h23 shared by equation (3) by symmetry. 
c Percentage of total pounds sold that is random weight. 




Table 3.  Inverse Rotterdam Model Elasticities.
a
 
Equation  Explanatory Var.  Estimate  Std Error 
 
Grapefruit P.  Scale  -0.931  0.058 
Grapefruit Q.  -0.377  0.037 
Orange Q.  -0.365  0.030 
Tangerine Q.  -0.189  0.017 
Gft. RW %
b 0.273  0.091 
Oran. RW %
b -0.141  0.058 
   Tang. RW %
b -0.215  0.081 
 
Orange P.  Scale  -0.995  0.036 
Grapefruit Q.  -0.094  0.009 
Orange Q.  -0.731  0.023 
Tangerine Q.  -0.170  0.013 
Gft. RW %
b -0.047  0.016 
Oran. RW %
b 0.081  0.034 
   Tang. RW %
b -0.215  0.081 
 
Tangerine P.  Scale  -1.061  0.106 
Grapefruit Q.  -0.144  0.018 
Orange Q.  -0.529  0.068 
Tangerine Q.  -0.387  0.042 
Gft. RW %
b -0.047  0.016 
Oran. RW %
b -0.140  0.058 
   Tang. RW %
b 0.759  0.286 
 
a At sample budget share means. 




                                                 
1 Barnett, Byron, and Mountain show that the Rotterdam model is a flexible specification 
comparable to other popular functional forms such as the Almost Ideal Demand System or 
AIDS (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a,b).  
 
2 Alternative popular demand models based on the cost or expenditure function such as, 
for example, the recent nested PIGLOG model (Piggott) which embeds the AIDS and 
related models were not used as their relationship to the Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann 
relationship is less direct.  The AIDS cost function, for example, does not have an 
associated closed form direct utility function, making  the linkage between  its demand 
equations, first-order conditions and the Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship less 
straightforward. 
 
3 The preference variable results for the Rotterdam model can also be extended to AIDS-
like models.  The AIDS model’s dependent variable is the budget share wi = piqi /x.  
Taking the log of this budget share results in (i) log wi = log pi + log qi - log x, and its 
total differential is (ii) d(log wi) = d(log pi) + d(log qi) - d (log x), or noting d(log wi) = 
dwi /wi , (iii) dwi = wid(log pi) + wid(log qi) - wid(log x).  The latter equality implies (iv) 
dwi /d(log zj)  =  wid(log qi )/d(log zj), and since wid(log qi) is the dependent variable of 
the direct Rotterdam demand system, this result implies that preference variable effects 
are the same in each model.  That is, the Rotterdam preference variable term, 3jβij d(log 
zj), in equation (1), is also applicable for AIDS-like models.  An approximation of the 26 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
differential AIDS model is (v) dwi = 3j cij Dpj + bi DQ + 3jβij Dzj (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980a; Barten, 1993).     Substituting equation (v) into (iii) and rearranging 
results in (vi) wiDqi = (bi + wi)DQ + 3j (cij - wi ∆ ij + wi wj)Dpj + 3jβij Dzj, where ∆ij is the 
Kronecker delta (∆ij = 1 if i = j, otherwise ∆ij = 0).  From equation (vi) we conclude that 
(vii) πij = (cij - wi ∆ ij + wi wj).  Thus, in equation (v), the preference variable coefficient 
can be specified as (vii) βik = -3j (cij - wi ∆ ij + wi wj) γjk, based on equation (2).  In 
estimating AIDS-like model (v) with βij defined by (vii), budget shares used as 
explanatory variables might be replaced by their lagged values to avoid endogeneity.  If 
direct estimates of the coefficients of an AIDS-like model (bi, cij, and γij) are available, 
the corresponding inverse demand relationship could be found for some set of budget 
shares as shown in this paper with θi = (bi + wi ),  πij = (cij - wi ∆ ij + wi wj), and βik = -3j 
(cij - wi ∆ ij + wi wj) γjk. 
 
4  Adding an n x 1 vector of error terms e to the direct demand equations (5a), the error 
terms in the inverse demand equations (12) are ŵδŵ
-1e.  Given e is independent of the 
Divisia volume index DQ in the direct demand equations (rational random behavior), 
ŵδŵ
-1e is independent of DQ in the inverse demand equations. 